The clause of Russian roulette provides that in the event of an impasse, one of the employees (or both) can decide the transfer of the respective participation, forces the other partner to choose between two alternatives: at the latest with the decision of the Nuremberg Oberlandesgericht of 20 However, a higher court has confirmed the admissibility in principle of the so-called "Russian roulette" clauses, since , according to the Tribunal, these clauses are not intended to allow the exclusion of a shareholder without objective reason, but primarily to resolve impasses that jeopardize the sustainability of the company. At the international level, it is often the use in the statute of the "Russian roulette clause", typical of common law systems, on which the Notarrat of Milan recently pronounced with the maximum No. 181 of 2019. The Court focused on the different nature of the burden of Russian roulette clauses and clauses and concluded that it was not necessary to indicate land in the Russian roulette clauses; Indeed, if the proverbial "horse has already left the barn" and a dispute between shareholders intensifies, the settlement of the dispute is generally costly and the outcome uncertain, unless a shareholder agreement or the statutes and other agreements provide for appropriate provisions. A deadlock clause is a provision to resolve a situation where there is a significant disagreement (or "deadlock") between shareholders, but no party has a majority. That is, if 4 shareholders do not agree on an issue and each hold 25% of the company`s shares. In particular cases, scepters can position themselves on admissibility, for example. B where one of the two shareholders is unable to finance a takeover bid and the mechanism for enforcing the closing procedure, which is detrimental to him, should be avoided as much as possible. This clause imposes liquidation in the event of an impasse. Shareholders are involved in both the costs and expenses associated with the liquidation of the transaction. This solution usually occurs when the problem is in a deadlock for a long time. This clause is only appropriate in serious situations where the company is on its feet. This clause allows one or more shareholders who agree on a solution of the issue to buy the other shareholders at an agreed price, but also allows other shareholders to buy it at the same price.
If no one agrees to sell at this price, this clause may degenerate to allow counter-offers until a reasonable price is reached. This solution generally requires the exit of a certain number of shareholders and favours shareholders who are in a stronger financial position. The decision of the Court of Rome gives us some advice on how to design an opposable Russian roulette clause taking into account Italian legal principles: The Court has considered each of the following arguments that uses Beta to prove that the clauses of Russian roulette are invalid according to the principles of Italian corporate law. The Court objected to Beta`s interpretation and found that the purpose of the Russian roulette clauses (which regard the non-renewal of shareholder agreements as the trigger of the event) (a) was not to intercept shareholders in permanent shareholder agreements, but (b) to preserve the functioning of a company`s decision-making bodies and thus prevent the dissolution of the company. The clause provides that one of the two shareholders (or both, if agreed) has the authority to determine the value of its 50% capital after the given trigger event.